The Canadian Organization of Medical Physicists (COMP), in close partnership with the Canadian Partnership for Quality Radiotherapy (CPQR) has developed a series of Technical Quality Control (TQC) guidelines for radiation treatment equipment.
All information contained in this document is intended to be used at the discretion of each individual center to help guide quality and safety program improvement. There are no legal standards supporting this document; specific federal or provincial regulations and license conditions take precedence over the content of this document.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| SYSTEM DE SCRIPTION
The fundamental definition of a data management system (DMS) has not changed since the publication of the Canadian Association of Provincial Cancer Agencies (CAPCA) quality control document for data management systems in 2008: a DMS is the information infrastructure which is directly related to the planning, delivery, quality assurance, and archival of patient treatments. In its simplest incarnation, a DMS can be a single computer. However, in the typical radiation treatment clinic, a DMS is comprised of many separate entities or systems that manage, store, and exchange information of many types and formats via various methods and protocols. The level of complexity of computer systems in radiation oncology clinics has seen a tremendous increase over the past several years. In part, this increase is due to the evolution of radiation treatment technology -the increasing complexity of treatment delivery systems which themselves contain multiple computerized systems, the ongoing evolution of onboard imaging systems, the increased variety and quantity of diagnostic and simulation imaging studies involved in the planning process, and the ever-increasing evolution and scope of record/verify electronic medical record systems. The ongoing transition of many clinics toward a paperless or "paperlight" environment is even further increasing the quantity and variety of data stored and managed by computerized systems in the clinic. And of course, beyond the walls of our clinics, the world of information technology and data management is expanding at a relentless pace -so that the hospital infrastructure and systems that often form the backbone of our radiation clinics' data management systems are also evolving rapidly.
A comprehensive quality assurance program for a DMS should consider all of the separate components in the DMS, the exchange of data between components, and the procedures governing that exchange. Accordingly, the program could have three general categories:
1. Quality assurance of computerized systems: performance and functionality of each individual component in the DMS, data integrity within each component;
2. Quality assurance of data exchange: data exchange between components in the DMS (multiple formats, multiple protocols, via interface, or manual data transfer); and 3. Quality assurance of procedures (including data entry and data interpretation).
Key features of a quality assurance program should include:
assembling a multidisciplinary team with regular meetings and clearly established roles and responsibilities; project management of scheduled upgrades and systematic tracking and evaluation of hardware and software failures and issues, and subsequent root-cause analysis.
Each radiation treatment clinic's DMS is unique, making it impossible to prescribe a universal or one size fits all quality assurance program. Instead, this guidance document offers a step-by-step approach to aid the medical physicist in designing a tailored, context-specific quality assurance program for each unique DMS (see Appendix 1). The lists of test categories included in Tables 1 and 2 and the specific tests detailed in Section 5 are meant to be comprehensive but not prescriptive, serving as a recipe box from which the qualified medical physicist can select the appropriate tests for their unique DMS. Furthermore, testing frequencies must be established based on in-depth knowledge of the relevant clinical processes -the suggestions made in this document serve as a reasonable baseline that should be modified to suit a given DMS. Some of the tests chosen for the DMS quality assurance program will likely be the responsibility of IT personnel. Others will be the responsibility of the medical physicist. It is probable that some of the tests will require collaboration and input from the appropriate vendor. The approach described here is adapted in part from that sug- The integration of such testing tools in a clinic's DMS requires collaboration with IT personnel and the appropriate vendors. Also note that the timing of automated tests should include sufficient delays between executions to avoid placing an artificial load on the system (which could artificially produce errors).
3.B | Checksums and data validation
A checksum is a type of redundancy check that can be used to evaluate data integrity following transmission across a network (or data link), or following any other manipulation that could introduce error. Suggested frequency: At commissioning, and following any change to the DMS components connected by the data link that could affect imaging data (e.g., upgrade of CBCT software). This test is often part of existing quality assurance of imaging systems.
C Data transfer integrity of images and imaging data
Test: Image quality: Using an appropriate phantom, evaluate image contrast, noise, and image intensity (e.g., HU value).
Identify data degradation or distortion (e.g., due to compression). Compare values before and after image transfer. Compare against baseline or tolerance values as appropriate.
Test: File integrity: Using checksums or other tools, evaluate the integrity of the imaging files before and after transfer.
Note that this test is required in addition to the above tests as it is possible for errors in integrity to be introduced that will not be visually apparent or detectable within the software used for image analysis.
Suggested frequency: At commissioning, and following any change to the DMS components connected by the data link that could affect imaging data (e.g., upgrade of CBCT software). This test is often part of existing quality assurance of imaging systems.
L3 Data transfer integrity of electronic documents
Test: Verify that transfer of electronic documents occurs as expected and that data format and integrity is maintained.
Test should include all relevant document formats. Checksum or appropriate tools should be used in addition to visual inspection as errors can be introduced that will not inhibit document processing software from opening and manipulating the file. Suggested frequency: At commissioning or as needed (for example during troubleshooting for performance issues).
5.B | Notes on tests for DMS components
Tests in this section apply to individual computerized systems within the DMS. In addition to the tests suggested here, vendor recommendations for commissioning, acceptance testing, and regular quality assurance should be followed. Some tests are also applicable to DMS data links -they are listed again here for completeness as they should be considered when implementing a new DMS component (or following an upgrade or other significant change). The production of this manuscript has been made possible through a financial contribution from Health Canada, through the Canadian Partnership Against Cancer.
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R E F E R E N C E S
APPEN DIX 1 METHODOLOGY FOR BUILDING A DMS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
This appendix provides additional information on how to develop a robust quality assurance program for a DMS.
STEP 1: IDENTI FY THE COMPUTERI ZED SYSTEMS IN YOUR DMS
A DMS is usually composed of multiple computerized systems. The components of a DMS are specific to each center and may include one or more computerized systems from the following categories:
• Treatment delivery systems, onboard imaging systems and associated control computers, and other critical computer systems that are directly involved in delivering, monitoring, or controlling the delivery of radiation.
• Imaging systems such as CT, PET/CT, or magnetic resonance simulators and other diagnostic imaging equipment.
• Treatment planning system(s).
• Record and verify systems (R&V).
• Electronic medical record (EMR).
• Data storage servers and archival systems (e.g., MOP, MDD).
• Application servers (e.g., Citrix servers).
• Ancillary radiation oncology software within the DMS (e.g., independent monitor unit calculation software, quality assurance tools, patient safety, and event tracking systems, etc.).
• Hospital information systems (e.g., Meditech), infrastructure and network architecture. Data types or formats may include:
• Images and imaging data (I):
• Medical images (DICOM images, digitally reconstructed radiographs [DRRs], CBCT, portal images, etc.)
• Image associated data (structure sets, isocenter information, etc.)
• Other images (e.g., setup, patient or field images in.JPG or.TIFF format)
• Third party imaging data (respiratory/infrared/electromagnetic tracking systems)
• Treatment delivery information (T): • Third party data (respiratory/infrared/electromagnetic tracking systems)
• Vendor/proprietary information • General/demographics (G):
• Health Information System (HIS) and HL7 data (demographics, etc.) • Laboratory, pharmacy, or other data (various formats)
• Electronic documents that form part of electronic medical record (e.g., PDFs, MS Word, Excel, MOSAIQ e-SCRIBE, e-SCAN, proprietary formats, etc.)
• Proprietary Pushed data (antivirus, user authentication, daemons services)
• Proprietary Pulled data (user authentication, daemons services)
Methods/types of data exchange:
• DICOM or DICOM RT (DCM):
• Import/export over network using standard DICOM or DICOM RT protocols
• Manual entry of data into one system with reference to another system (or hard copy)
• Interfaces (HL7, CI, PI):
• Standard interfaces (e.g., HL7 for demographic data transfer)
• Custom interfaces (e.g., script for transfer of scheduling info from EMR to HIS)
• Vendor-specific or proprietary interfaces (e.g., image data transfer between treatment machine console and onboard imaging system)
• Removable media (RM):
• Import/export from storage media (CDs, external, etc.) c. Low importance: The parameter is not necessary for the safe delivery of the treatment or a delay or error in the transfer of this parameter has no effect on the safe delivery of treatment.
Note that each center should independently assess the criticality of each parameter for the safe delivery of patient care as this is highly dependent on the configuration of a given DMS. Also note that the categorization of certain parameters may be different in an emergency vs. nonemergency treatment scenario.
2). Consider the probability or risk of failure of each data link and assign a level of "High," "Medium," or, "Low" risk. Factors that could lead to a higher risk of failure include: manual entry of data or wherever human error can be introduced; incomplete data transfers or exchanges (where some correction or manual entry is required); exchange based on proprietary methods that may less transparent to the user; exchange with systems outside of the clinic where many more variables may be unknown; exchange over custom interfaces (vs. "off-the-shelf", rigorously tested interfaces -though these also can lead to the introduction of errors); and corrections or changes to original treatment data (requiring manual correction or re-import of partial treatment data). The availability of support and the known stability of the data link or systems involved could also be considered.
The extent of data redundancy and network rerouting capabilities in the event of catastrophic failures may also be factored in the risk analysis for more complex architectures.
A data link table can be constructed. For each data link, the sender, receiver, data type, and method of transfer can be included, as well as the assigned level of importance and level of risk. The table can then be sorted based on the combined importance and risk "score" of each data link. An example is included in Table A1 .
Other risk analysis methods, such as failure mode effects analysis (FMEA) could also be utilized. Regardless of the method, the goal is to establish clear priorities for which elements of the DMS should be tested when it is not possible to develop an exhaustive program. The risk analysis also aids in establishing testing frequencies later in the quality assurance program design process, and can help define the scope of responsibilities for medical physicists, IT personnel, and vendors.
STEP 4: DETERMINE TH E SCOPE OF THE QU ALI TY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
The next step of the process is to establish the scope of the DMS quality assurance program using the system map and • R&V/EMR, including application servers;
• Radiation therapy databases, storage and archival systems; and • Any other computerized system in the radiotherapy network that handles clinical data and is excluded for the reasons outlined above.
Systems that may not be within the scope of a DMS quality assurance program:
• Treatment delivery systems and associated control computers (e.g., linear accelerators, brachytherapy afterloader and delivery systems, orthovoltage units, etc.);
• Onboard imaging systems (e.g., CBCT, portal imaging);
• Treatment simulators (CT, PET/CT, MRI);
• Other diagnostic imaging systems (Portable x ray systems, Ultrasound, etc.); and
• Treatment planning systems.
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Where these systems are included in existing quality assurance programs, the physicist should evaluate whether the existing procedures cover all relevant aspects of data management and quality assurance. Where appropriate, consider additional or modified quality assurance procedures as needed (refer to Step 5). Consider that the transfer of certain data between DMS components may be validated as part of patient specific quality assurance. Where this is the case, ensure that the patient-specific quality assurance procedure is documented and that all relevant aspects of data quality are addressed (see
Step 5 for guidance on the types of tests that may apply).
Finally, identify external systems that are maintained by hospital IT staff or manufacturers through service contracts and are therefore outside the scope of your clinic's quality assurance responsibilities.
Remember that application servers and hardware may be physically Interdepartmental policies and procedures that formalize this communication pipeline should be in place and should be revised on an annual basis or whenever a major change to the DMS occurs.
It may be useful to update the data link and component tables to include only those elements that are within the scope of the DMS quality assurance program; however, it is recommended to document the responsible party and/or applicable quality assurance program for each element that is considered out of scope. and Tables A1-A3 is presented in Table A4 .
Quality assurance of procedures
Quality assurance of the procedures governing the exchange of data between components of the DMS, including procedures for generating, entering, and interpreting the data. Procedures must be designed to be robust in the presence of potential data errors. When developing a quality assurance program for a DMS, it is important to build in mechanisms for adapting to changeswhether to a single component of the DMS, to a clinical process, or a change affecting the entire DMS. Process and system maps become obsolete quickly and it is important to maintain these as living documents.
Contingency planning
One of the challenges of a radiation oncology DMS is the provi- The EMR may be reliant on document servers and data redundant architectures which themselves may be subjected to periodic, planned, or unexpected outages. Again, testing of back up servers and fault tolerant systems are best performed when there are planned outages.
The same strategy for contingency testing holds true for inter/intranet connections between the components of the DMS.
APPENDIX 2
SITE-SPECIFIC DMS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM EXAMPLE
This appendix provides an example of how the principles of the guideline may be applied to a specific DMS. 
TOLERANCES
The specific tests required will depend highly on the infrastructure and configuration of the institution's DMS, as previously discussed. Step 1 
